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Fraser Duncan*

Illuminating False Light: Assessing the Case
for the False Light Tort in Canada

The false light tort has been the most contentious of the four privacy torts recognized
in many US states, receiving criticism for its uncertain connection to privacy interests,
its overlap with defamation and its chilling effect on free speech. While the tort has not
previously received much judicial or scholarly attention in Canada, the recent decision
of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in Yenovkian v Gulian recognized false light
as a cause of action in the province. This article cautions other Canadian common law
courts against following suit through an analysis of the nature, history, and criticisms
of the tort in the US. Although a narrow version of the tort could differentiate the action
from defamation, the privacy interests protected may not be sufficiently widespread
and significant enough to warrant extending the common law. Furthermore, the chilling
effect on freedom of speech cannot be discounted.
Le délit consistant à présenter une personne sous un faux jour a été considéré comme
le plus controversé des quatre délits contre la vie privée reconnus dans de nombreux
États américains, recevant des critiques pour son lien incertain avec le droit au respect
de la vie privée, son chevauchement avec la diffamation et son effet paralysant sur la
liberté d’expression. Bien que ce délit n’ait pas reçu beaucoup d’attention judiciaire
ou académique au Canada, la récente décision de la Cour supérieure de justice
de l’Ontario dans l’affaire Yenovkian c. Gulian a reconnu que la présentation d’une
personne sous un faux jour constitue une cause d’action dans la province. Dans le
présent article, nous mettons en garde les autres tribunaux canadiens de common law
contre la possibilité de donner suite à cette décision en analysant la nature, l’histoire et
les critiques de ce type de délit aux États-Unis. Bien qu’une interprétation plus étroite
du délit puisse le différencier de la diffamation, le droit au respect de la vie privée ainsi
protégé peut ne pas être suffisamment étendu et important pour justifier l’extension de
la common law. En outre, l’effet dissuasif sur la liberté d’expression ne peut être écarté.
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Introduction
In a “world without privacy, or at least a world in which the meaning
of privacy is radically transformed both as a legal idea and a lived
reality,”1 common law courts could play a vital role in providing greater
protection for individuals’ privacy rights. Other Commonwealth countries
offer limited guidance about the potential merits of judicial innovation.
English courts have rejected a general tort of invasion of privacy2 and
have instead relied on a modified breach of confidence action to protect
1.
Austin Sarat, “Whither Privacy? An Introduction” in Austin Sarat, ed, A World Without Privacy:
What Law Can and Should Do? (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015) 1 at 1.
2.
Wainwright v Home Office, [2003] UKHL 53, [2004] 2 AC 406 at para 35.
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against unwanted disclosures.3 The recent experience of New Zealand has
more relevance,4 but the privacy torts adopted there are “still in [their]
infancy”5 and the caselaw is limited.6 Instead, the obvious example of a
country that has developed novel privacy torts is the US where, in many
states, four discrete privacy actions (intrusion upon seclusion, public
disclosure of private facts, false light, appropriation) have been available
for decades. Indeed, courts in the common law world have drawn heavily
on US jurisprudence when considering novel privacy torts.7
The latest Canadian example of US influence on the development of
privacy torts is Yenovkian v Gulian, decided in December 2019, in which
the Ontario Superior Court of Justice recognized false light as a cause of
action.8 Until Yenovkian, the false light tort had neither received much
attention from Canadian courts nor from Canadian legal scholars. The
tort provides a cause of action when a plaintiff has been placed in a false
light before the public if this representation was “highly offensive to a
reasonable person” and if the defendant had “knowledge of or acted in
reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false
light in which the other would be placed.”9 The false representation
in question may defame the plaintiff but does not need to: the critical
question is whether the representation amounts to a highly offensive
one.10 False light also differs from defamation by protecting privacy
interests rather than reputation, although this point is contested. False light
has been the most controversial of the four American privacy torts: the
action’s similarity to defamation has been a focal point of criticism in the
US and offers a possible explanation for the limited Canadian discussion

3.
Campbell v MGN, [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457.
4.
The New Zealand Court of Appeal recognized the tort of public disclosure of private facts in
Hosking v Runting, [2004] NZCA 34, [2005] 1 NZLR 1 [Hosking] while the New Zealand High Court
adopted intrusion upon seclusion in C v Holland, [2012] NZHC 2155 [Holland].
5.
Siemer v Spartan News Ltd, [2014] NZHC 3175 at para 151 [Siemer].
6.
This is particularly true of the intrusion upon seclusion tort as no other claim on this basis
appears to have succeeded. The High Court of New Zealand held that a police search pursuant to a
lawful warrant did not cause an intrusion upon seclusion in Siemer, supra note 5 at para 152 while it
also dismissed an action in Henderson v Slevin, [2015] NZHC 366 at paras 69, 71 as the claim failed to
demonstrate an area of seclusion and the defendants’ actions were not highly offensive to a reasonable
person. In Duval v Clift, [2014] NZHC 1950 at para 104, the claim for intrusion upon seclusion was
judged to be of no merit with little discussion of the cause of action. In Faesenkloet v Jenkin, [2014]
NZHC 1637 at paras 38, 53 Justice Asher questioned whether two distinct privacy torts were required,
framing his analysis instead around the tort of invasion of privacy.
7.
See eg Hosking, supra note 4; Holland, supra note 4; Jones v Tsige, 2012 ONCA 32 [Jones];
Doe 464533 v ND, 2016 ONSC 541 [Doe].
8.
2019 ONSC 7279 [Yenovkian].
9.
Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts § 652E (1977) [Restatement].
10. Ibid § 652D.

608 The Dalhousie Law Journal

of the tort’s utility. Nonetheless, the decision in Yenovkian confirms the
recent Ontario trend of judicial openness to novel privacy torts following
the earlier recognition of intrusion upon seclusion in Jones11 and public
disclosure of private facts in Doe.12 Whether this trend extends beyond
Ontario remains to be seen. There are, however, some hints that, postJones, other Canadian jurisdictions may follow the Ontario example.13
This article considers whether the false light tort should be imported
into Canada, following the decision in Yenovkian, through an assessment
of its value as a cause of action in the US. The first section outlines the
different development of the protection of privacy in the common law in
the US and Canada while the second section elaborates on the elements of
the false light action. The third section explores the history of the tort in the
US, highlighting its checkered history. This section also underscores the
importance of the broader context of changes in US defamation law to the
tort’s growth. The following three sections explore the most substantive
criticisms of the action: uncertainty as to the interests protected by the
tort, its viability as an independent cause of action, and its alleged chilling
effect on freedom of speech. Some of the problems with false light can
be avoided by adopting a narrower version of the tort that only provides
relief for non-defamatory statements about an individual that infringe
on their privacy rights. However, questions remain about whether the
privacy interests protected by this constrained version of false light are
sufficiently widespread and significant enough to require protection under
the common law. Moreover, despite significant differences between the
Canadian and American approaches to free speech, the chilling argument
cannot be ignored. For these reasons, it is not recommended that Canadian
courts adopt the false light action.
I. Common law protection of privacy in the US and Canada
Invasion of privacy has long been recognized in the US as actionable in
tort law. Following the famous call by Warren Brandeis and Louis Brandeis
11. Jones, supra note 7.
12. Doe, supra note 7.
13. See eg VonMaltzahn v Koppernaes, 2018 NSSC 192 at paras 48-51 (finding that the defendant
had invaded the plaintiff’s privacy); Carbone v Burnett, 2019 ABQB 98 at paras 46-47 (finding that
the elements of intrusion upon seclusion had been not made out but not expressly rejecting the tort’s
availability in Alberta); Grant v Winnipeg Regional Health Authority et al, 2015 MBCA 44 at para 126
(acknowledging the hypothetical possibility of a claim for intrusion upon seclusion and/or false light
in Manitoba); Hynes v Western Regional Integrated Health Authority, 2014 NLTD(G) 137 at para 25
(acknowledging that Newfoundland and Labrador privacy legislation does not exhaustively occupy
the field and preclude common law privacy torts). Contra Ari v Insurance Corporation of British
Columbia, 2013 BCSC 1308 at para 63 (confirming that there was no tort of invasion or breach or
privacy in British Columbia).
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in 1890 for the common law to protect the right to be let alone,14 courts
across the country began to recognize tortious invasions of privacy so that
“[b]y 1960, a large number of cases had been decided under the auspices
of the emerging privacy doctrine.”15 William Prosser’s celebrated 1960
article attempted to provide greater structure to this doctrine.16 His survey
of the emerging case law in this area led him to identify four discrete tort
actions protecting privacy: intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion, public
disclosure of embarrassing facts about the plaintiff, publicity that places
the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye, and appropriation of the
plaintiff’s name for the defendant’s advantage. Prosser’s classification,
later adopted in the Restatement,17 has “proved highly persuasive to states,
lawmakers, and judges and has become the modern framework for the
privacy tort in the United States.”18 Not all US jurisdictions recognize
each of the four torts,19 but Prosser’s work continues to be the starting
point for judicial consideration of the validity and extent of tort actions for
privacy infringements.20
Unlike their counterparts in the US, Canadian courts have traditionally
been resistant to attempts to extend the common law to provide a distinct
tort action for invasions of privacy.21 Other causes of action, such as
trespass to land and defamation, potentially offer some protection
against such intrusions,22 but the prospect of a remedy hinges wholly
on the specific facts in any given case.23 Some protection, both in the
common law and in statute, is available to prevent the misappropriation
of personality.24 Moreover, statutory torts of invasion of privacy exist in
14. “The Right to Privacy” (1890) 4:5 Harvard L Rev 193.
15. Gary T Schwartz, “Explaining and Justifying a Limited Tort of False Light Invasion of Privacy”
(1991) 41:3 Case W Res L Rev 885 at 885.
16. William L Prosser, “Privacy” (1960) 48:3 Cal L Rev 383.
17. Restatement, supra note 9.
18. Paul M Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, “Prosser’s ‘Privacy’ and the German Right of
Personality: Are Four Privacy Torts Better than One Unitary Concept?” (2010) 98:6 Cal L Rev 1925
at 1938.
19. See Section III-3, below.
20. See eg the judgments in Denver Pub Co v Bueno, 54 P (3d) 893 (Colo Sup Ct 2002) [Bueno],
Jews For Jesus, Inc v Rapp, 997 So (2d) 1098 at 1109 (Fla Sup Ct 2008) [Rapp] and West v Media
General Convergence, Inc, 53 SW (3d) 640 at 645-646 (Tenn Sup Ct 2001) [West].
21. Chris DL Hunt, “Conceptualizing Privacy and Elucidating its Importance: Foundational
Considerations for the Development of Canada’s Fledgling Privacy Tort” (2011) 37:1 Queen’s LJ 167
at 168 [Hunt, “Conceptualizing”].
22. John DR Craig, “Invasion of Privacy and Charter Values: The Common-Law Tort Awakens”
(1997) 42:2 McGill LJ 355 at 366.
23. See eg the discussion in Chris DL Hunt, “The Common Law’s Hodgepodge Protection of
Privacy” (2015) 66 UNBLJ 161 at 164-179.
24. Amy M Conroy, “Protecting Your Personality Rights in Canada: A Matter of Property or
Privacy?” (2012) 1 Western J Leg Studies 3.
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some of the common law provinces (Saskatchewan,25 British Columbia,26
Manitoba,27 and Newfoundland and Labrador28). However, there are strong
grounds to doubt their effectiveness.29 The general picture is of limited and
inconsistent privacy protection in the common law in Canada. There is
therefore a gap in privacy protection in Canadian law and common law
privacy torts may offer one way to rectify this.
Recent decisions in Ontario that have explicitly borrowed from US
jurisprudence suggest a possible change of direction. In Jones, the Ontario
Court of Appeal recognized an action for intrusion upon seclusion,30
while the Ontario Superior Court adopted the tort of public disclosure of
embarrassing private facts in Doe.31 Although the precedential value of the
latter is questionable,32 the two decisions together seem to indicate a greater
judicial willingness, in one province at least, to reconsider whether tort
law can play a role in defending individual privacy with some observers.
Until 2019, only three of Prosser’s torts had been relevant in
Canada. The false light tort, by contrast, had been largely ignored.
Judicial consideration in Canada of the merits of the false light tort has
been extremely limited.33 A false light claim was rejected by the Court
of Queen’s Bench of Manitoba in Parasuik v Canadian Newspapers Co

25. The Privacy Act, RSS 1978, c P-24.
26. Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 373.
27. The Privacy Act, RSM 1987, c P125.
28. Privacy Act, RSNL 1990, c P-22.
29. A 2003 review of claims under the various provincial privacy statutes highlighted the limited
success of plaintiffs and the modest damages awarded in successful claims: see Simon Chester, Jason
Murphy & Eric Robb, “Zapping the Paparazzi: Is the Tort of Privacy Alive and Well?” (2003) 27:4
Adv Q 357 at 359. See also David H Flaherty, “Some Reflections on Privacy and Technology” (1998)
26:2 Man LJ 219 at 222. The Privacy Act in Saskatchewan, supra note 25, for example, reflects
the prevalent concerns (eg wiretapping) at the time of its creation and is arguably unsuited to meet
the challenges posed by contemporary information and communications technology. The hope of its
drafters that its vague provisions would be developed and elaborated by the courts has not been borne
out in practice. Indeed, from 1972, the year of its adoption, until 2012, there was only one reported
decision under the Saskatchewan Privacy Act (Law Reform Commission of Saskatchewan, Renewing
the Privacy Act, Final Report (2012) at 3, 22, online (pdf): <https://lawreformcommission.sk.ca/
Renewing_the_Privacy_Act_Final_Report.pdf> [https://perma.cc/2UEJ-VUMU]).
30. Jones, supra note 7.
31. Doe, supra note 7.
32. It was a lower court decision with multiple causes of action that was subsequently reversed on
procedural grounds in Jane Doe 464533 v ND, 2016 ONSC 4920.
33. A Quicklaw search for the Boolean term “false light” uncovered only thirty-nine Canadian cases
(counting appeals of a lower court judgment separately), of which twelve were judgments that used
the term in a more generic sense. Four cases, mentioned in the text, considered the false light claim in
some detail, a further six involved preliminary decisions allowing or striking a claim without extensive
consideration of the validity of the action, and one referred to a tort claim in the US. The remaining
sixteen cases quoted Prosser’s categorization without specifically commenting on the existence of a
false light tort.
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as having no foundation in either statute or the common law.34 Both the
Supreme Court of British Columbia35 and the Ontario Superior Court of
Justice36 had rejected false light claims on the facts while not definitively
ruling out the existence of the tort.
Similarly, there has been little academic discussion of the applicability
of false light in the Canadian context. In a short footnote in a recent
article, Chris DL Hunt rejects the adoption of the tort, arguing the interest
protected is reputation, not privacy, and that there is too much overlap
with defamation.37 John DR Craig, too, dismisses the tort in the Canadian
context because the element of falsity clouds the privacy interests at stake.
He argues that such actions are more appropriately treated as defamation
actions if the reputation of the plaintiff is damaged, or as public disclosure
of embarrassing facts actions if the defendant’s publicity impinges on the
right to be let alone.38 Beyond this, however, few Canadian scholars have
assessed the utility of the tort.39
The false light tort has been the most contentious of Prosser’s four
torts40 with many critics denying its relevance to the protection of privacy,41
decrying its impact on free speech,42 and attacking its application by
courts.43 The tort has been variously labelled “conceptually empty,”44
“amorphous,”45 and also “over-grown.”46 False light also seems intrinsically
linked to the American context, specifically the stringent restrictions on
defamation actions, as the action provides a potential means to circumvent
these limitations.47 Given the significance of this context and the repeated
interrogations of the tort’s legitimacy in its native jurisdictional habitat,
false light may not be the most obvious candidate for importation.

34. [1988] 53 Man R (2d) 78 at 80, 2 WWR 737.
35. Silber v British Columbia Television Broadcasting System Ltd (1985), 25 DLR (4th) 345 at 354355, 2 WWR 609.
36. Chandra v Canadian Broadcasting Corp, 2015 ONSC 5303 at para 44.
37. Hunt, “Conceptualizing,” supra note 21 at 175, n 27.
38. Craig, supra note 22 at 382-383.
39. Other exceptions include a short positive assessment in HJ Glasbeek, “Outraged Dignity—Do
We Need a New Tort?” (1968) 6:1 Alta L Rev 77 at 79 and a one-sentence rejection of the tort as
overlapping with defamation in Russell Brown, “Rethinking Privacy: Exclusivity, Private Relation
and Tort Law” (2006) 43:3 Alta L Rev 589 at 593.
40. Lake v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, 582 NW (2d) 231 at 235 (Minn Sup Ct 1998) [Wal-Mart].
41. Bruce A McKenna, “False Light: Invasion of Privacy” 15 Tulsa LJ 113 at 126.
42. Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, “False Light Invasion of Privacy: The Light that Failed” (1989)
64:2 NYUL Rev 364 at 435-451.
43. J Clark Kelso, “False Light Privacy: A Requiem” (1992) 32:3 Santa Clara L Rev 783 at 819.
44. Zimmerman, supra note 42 at 369.
45. Bueno, supra note 20 at 904.
46. Schwartz, supra note 15 at 918.
47. See Sections IV–VI, below.
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Nonetheless, the decision in Yenovkian has, at least for the time being,
introduced the action into Ontario, confirming earlier speculation that all
of Prosser’s privacy torts would eventually be recognized in the province.48
Justice Kristjanson’s judgment in Yenovkian provides a relatively
short justification for recognizing false light.49 The distinct interest
the action protects is “a person’s privacy right to control the way they
present themselves to the world.”50 According to the Restatement, the
misrepresentation may be defamatory but does not need to be.51 Justice
Kristjanson also acknowledges the overlap with the tort of public disclosure
of private facts, both in the shared elements of each action52 (ie publicity
that is highly offensive to a reasonable person) and in practice.53 However,
false light should be recognized as:
[i]t follows that one who subjects another to highly offensive publicity
can be held responsible whether the publicity is true or false. This indeed,
is precisely why the tort of publicity placing a person [in] a false light
should be recognized. It would be absurd if a defendant could escape
liability for invasion of privacy simply because the statements they have
made about another person are false.54

There is no reference to the debate within US jurisprudence and American
legal scholarship regarding the value of the tort. Admittedly, Yenovkian
may not have been an ideal case for such a discussion given the range of
orders and causes of action involved. The case arose from an exceptionally
acrimonious family law dispute in which the applicant father was found
to have engaged in “outrageous and egregious conduct at the extreme
of reprehensibility.”55 The applicant father was subject to a permanent
restraining order56 and an order for child and spousal support, with sole
custody awarded to the mother.57 The father was, inter alia, also ordered
to pay damages for intentional infliction of mental suffering, invasion
of privacy (both false light and public disclosure of private facts), and
punitive damages.58 Nonetheless, judicial innovation in extending the
48. Stephen Aylward, “The Idea of Privacy Law: Jones v Tsige and the Limits of the Common Law”
(2013) 71:1 UT Fac L Rev 61 at 71. Such speculation was based on the fact that Justice Sharpe had
appeared in Jones to embrace the entire Prosser framework (Jones, supra note 7 at para 21).
49. Yenovkian, supra note 8 at paras 170-174.
50. Ibid at para 171.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid at para 172.
53. Ibid at para 174.
54. Ibid at para 173.
55. Ibid at para 197.
56. Ibid at para 48.
57. Ibid at para 206.
58. Ibid.
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common law should be careful and considered. Before other Canadian
courts choose to follow the decision in Yenovkian, it is vital to scrutinize
the nature, history, and criticisms of the tort in the US.
II. An analysis of the false light tort
1. The elements of a false light action
a. Publicity
While the elements of false light bear some similarities with defamation,
one difference is the degree to which the defendant must have disseminated
the falsehood. Defamation under US tort law requires publication;
“widespread publicity” (but not necessarily publication) has been held to
be “an essential ingredient to any false light invasion of privacy claim.”59
The difference between publication and publicity has been described in the
following way:
‘Publication,’…includes any communication by the defendant to a third
person. ‘Publicity,’ on the other hand, means that the matter is made
public, by communicating it to the public at large, or to so many persons
that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become
one of public knowledge. The difference is not one of the means of
communication…It is one of a communication that reaches, or is sure to
reach, the public.60

As acknowledged by the Supreme Court of Alabama in Gary
v Crouch, publicity is clearly a higher threshold than publication.61
Information communicated to a single individual or a small group of
people will not suffice. For example, publicity has been held not to have
occurred when an investigative report has been handed over to a person
who initiated the investigation with an instruction to keep it confidential,62
nor when information alleging the plaintiff had misappropriated company
property is passed on to a small number of individuals at a corporation
and a government agency.63 The publicity requirement, by contrast,
will be satisfied by publication of the alleged falsehood in a newspaper
or magazine and by broadcast on television or radio.64 Publicity might
also mean dissemination of material not to the public at large but to a

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Crump v Beckley Newspapers, Inc, 320 SE (2d) 70 at 88 (W Va Supp Ct App 1984) [Crump].
Restatement, supra note 9 at § 652D.
867 So (2d) 310 at 318, n 6 (Ala Sup Ct 2003).
Johnston v Fuller, 706 So (2d) 700 at 5 (Ala Sup Ct 1997).
Freeman v Unisys Corp, 870 F Supp 169 at 12 (ED Mich 1994).
Richard E Kaye, Causes of Action, vol 33, 2nd ed (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2007) (WL).
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sufficiently large number of people, such as a letter sent to over 3,500
households as in Parnigoni v St. Columbia’s Nursery School.65
In some jurisdictions, an exception has been made to the “widespread”
condition for publicity where the communication is to an individual with
whom the plaintiff has a special relationship.66 However, despite being
cited elsewhere,67 the continuing validity of this exception is uncertain and
another, more recent Illinois district court chose to follow Seventh Circuit
precedent in adopting the much more demanding publicity standard
applied elsewhere.68
b. Falsehood
False light is set apart from the other privacy torts as it requires the
communication of a falsehood about the plaintiff. The plaintiff has to
prove the false nature of the statement.69 The falsehood can be defamatory
but need not be.70 The falsehood may take the form of a false description
of the plaintiff, a statement falsely attributed to the plaintiff, an incorrect
identification of the plaintiff as the subject of a photograph or a false
implication about the plaintiff’s character, proclivities or endorsement.71
Linked to the requirement that the falsity publicized be highly offensive
to the reasonable person, minor inaccuracies will not incur liability.72 For
instance, the Court of Appeals of Georgia rejected an exotic dancer’s
false light claim against a magazine publisher and a private club for
an advertisement featuring a picture of her on the basis that the only
inaccuracies contained within it were the dancer’s stage name and the false
implication that the dancer worked at the club being advertised.73 A plaintiff
will also not be allowed to recover when the claim centres on information
they argue should have been included along with the original material
communicated so long as the information publicized is “substantially
true.”74 Where, however, the defendant creates “a false impression by
knowingly or recklessly publicizing selective pieces of true information,”75
the plaintiff can prove falsity. Finally, due to the constitutional protection

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

681 F Supp (2d) 1 at 19 (DDC 2010).
Poulos v Lutheran Social Services of Illinois, Inc, 728 NE (2d) 547 at 555 (Ill App 1 Dist 2000).
Duncan v Peterson, 835 NE (2d) 411 at 423-424 (Ill App 2 Dist 2005).
Davis v Jewish Vocational Service, 2010 WL 1172537 (ND Ill).
Kaye, supra note 64.
David A Elder, The Law of Privacy (Deerfield, IL: Clark Boardman Callaghan, 1991) at 262.
Kaye, supra note 64.
Rinsley v Brandt, 700 F 2d 1304 at 1308 (10th Cir 2003).
Cabaniss v Hipsley, 151 SE 2d 496 at 503 (Ga App Ct 1966).
Goodrich v Waterbury Republican-American, Inc, 448 A (2d) 1317 at 1331 (Conn Sup Ct 1982).
Santillo v Reedel, 634 A 2d 264 at 267 (Pa Sup Ct 1993).
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of opinions,76 a false light action will not succeed where the defendant’s
representation is deemed by the court to qualify as an opinion.77
c. Identification of the plaintiff
The information publicized must be “concerning the other that places the
other in a false light.”78 Thus, the plaintiff must be clearly identifiable in
the defendant’s representation. The plaintiff need not be named by the
defendant,79 and defendants may still attract liability despite a disclaimer
that a piece of work is fiction.80 If the plaintiff is a member of a group
that is being placed in a false light, then a false light claim, following the
precedent set in defamation actions, will only succeed if the group is “so
small that the publicity can reasonably be understood as referring to that
individual”81 or if “the plaintiff can show that the circumstances of the
publication reasonably give rise to the conclusion that there is a particular
reference to the plaintiff.”82 While courts have generally borrowed the
framework for identification from defamation actions, Elder points to one
clear exception.83 Due to the difference between publication and publicity,
false light claims require that the plaintiff be identifiable to a wider group
of people beyond the plaintiff’s “small group of intimates.”84
d. Highly offensive to the reasonable person
False light, like public disclosure of private facts, requires that the
infringement of privacy be highly offensive to the reasonable person. The
highly offensive requirement sets a threshold for the imposition of liability
so that a false light action will not be successful “for the publication of
information [is] so innocuous that notice of potential harm would not be
present.”85 This is an objective standard: unusually sensitive plaintiffs will
not be granted relief.86 Kaye provides a series of illustrative categories
based on cases in which the highly offensive standard was satisfied. These
include where the plaintiff is described in crude and vulgar terms, where
76. Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc, 418 US 323 (1974) at 339-340 [Gertz].
77. Cibenko v Worth Publishers, Inc, 510 F Supp 761 at 766 (D NJ 1981).
78. Restatement, supra note 9 at § 652E.
79. In MG v Time Warner, Inc, 89 Cal App 4th 623 (2001), a Sports Illustrated story about sexual
abuse by coaches in youth sport used a team photograph of a Little League team to illustrate the story.
None of the plaintiffs were named, but the California Court of Appeal, affirming a lower court’s denial
of the defendant’s motion to strike the complaint, found the plaintiffs had a viable claim.
80. Muzikowski v Paramount Pictures Corp, 322 F 3d 918 at 927 (7th Cir 2003).
81. Michigan United Conservation Clubs v CBS News, 485 F Supp. 893 at 904 (WD Mich 1980)
82. Diaz v NBC Universal, Inc, 337 F App’x 94 at 96 (2d Cir 2009).
83. Elder, supra note 70 at 280.
84. Brauer v Globe Newspaper Co, 217 NE (2d) 736 at 740 (Mass Sup Jud Ct 1966).
85. Crump, supra note 59 at 90.
86. Godbehere v Phoenix Newspapers, Inc, 783 P2d 781 at 786 (Ariz Sup Ct 1989).
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the plaintiff’s professional reputation has been impugned by a falsehood,
where the plaintiff’s photo or name has been published in a sexually
explicit magazine, or where the defendant’s representation implies that
the plaintiff is a liar, has been unfaithful to their sexual partner, or has
committed criminal offences.87
e. Knowledge or reckless disregard as to falsity
The requirement of knowledge or reckless disregard as to falsity in
the Restatement’s definition reflects the extension to false light of the
constitutional protection provided to free speech in defamation actions.88
In the wake of Gertz,89 it is likely that that this constitutionally required
standard of fault, the “actual malice” standard, does not apply when the
plaintiff is a private individual and not a public figure. Gertz established
that states could set a lower level of fault (ie negligence) for defamation
claims by private individuals provided there was no strict liability.90 The
Restatement takes a cautious approach as to whether a false light action
can be based on the defendant’s negligent falsehood.91 However, a number
of states have adopted this lower fault requirement.92
2. Defences
The defences for false light actions effectively mirror those available in
defamation suits. The Restatement makes clear that absolute privilege
defences available in defamation actions also apply fully to the privacy
torts.93 Thus, an untruthful statement made during the middle of a judicial
proceeding could not be the basis for a false light claim. Consent is included
in the absolute privilege defences: as long as the disputed publicity does
not exceed the scope of the prior consent, it provides a full defence.94
Similarly, conditional privilege defences are wholly imported from
defamation actions.95 A defendant is therefore able to take reasonable steps
in the protection of his or her own interests, to communicate matters of
common interest, and to give information to public authorities regarding a
crime committed or potentially to be committed.96 A defence of conditional
privilege may be defeated if the information was communicated outside
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Kaye, supra note 64.
See Section III-2, below.
Supra, note 76.
Ibid at 347.
Supra note 9 at § 652E.
Kaye, supra note 64; Zimmerman, supra note 42 at 392, n 173.
Restatement, supra note 9 at § 652F.
Ibid.
Ibid at § 652G.
Elder, supra note 70 at 313-315.
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the privilege97 or if the plaintiff can show malice or bad faith on the part
of the defendant.98 Conditional privilege in the context of defamation has
been less important since the decision in New York Times v Sullivan99
relocated some of its traditional functions to the constitutional protections
afforded by the First Amendment.100
III. The history of the false light tort in the US
1. An inauspicious beginning?
Prosser’s influence in the origins of the false light tort cannot be questioned:
the term “false light” had not been connected to “privacy” in any reported
American judgments prior to Prosser’s article, but this changed in the
following years.101 However, his pioneering work in “finding” the tort has
been the focal point for criticism.
Prosser’s identification of false light as one of four privacy torts was
based on his survey of a number of American cases in which the false
light concept had, he claimed, gradually crystallised. The first false light
case, though, according to Prosser was an English one: in Lord Byron v
Johnston,102 a publisher was prevented from selling a poetry manuscript
he had falsely claimed had been authored by Lord Byron. Kelso pointedly
highlights that subsequent cases have treated this as a standard passing off
action in which Lord Byron sought to prevent the deceptive marketing of
a good which affected his business interests.103 Prosser’s misreading of this
case may not have undermined his underlying argument if the remaining
American case law withstood further scrutiny. Kelso, however, critically
re-examines each of the cases relied on by Prosser to substantiate his claim
of increasing “independent recognition” for the false light tort.104 Kelso
argues that Prosser’s survey involved substantial mischaracterization.
Regardless of whether the cases are centred on fictitious testimonials in
advertising, false attribution of books, articles, and ideas to the plaintiff, or
unauthorized use of the plaintiff’s name or picture (including in a rogue’s
gallery), Kelso argues that the cases were decided on various combinations
of libel, commercial misappropriation, and unfair competition.105 The
emergence of a new tort through these decisions was simply “wishful
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Restatement, supra note 9 at § 604.
Elder, supra note 70 at 315.
376 US 254 (1964) [Sullivan].
Rodney A Smolla, Law of Defamation (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2018) (WL).
Kelso, supra note 43 at 783.
(1816), 2 Mer 28, 35 ER 851 (Ch).
Kelso, supra note 43 at 792.
Prosser, supra note 16 at 398.
Kelso, supra note 43 at 814.
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thinking”106 and “[f]alse light existed only in Prosser’s mind.”107 Other
critics have been less acerbic while still acknowledging Prosser’s central
role in identifying the tort.108
Kelso’s forceful critique attacks the very foundation of the false light
tort and is difficult to reject without replicating his re-examination of cases.
The problematic beginning of the false light tort need not, however, fatally
damage the case for it. Prosser may have misrepresented, intentionally
or otherwise, the evidence for the prior existence of the tort, but this
problematic justification does not automatically damage other forms of
justification. In other words, it may be possible to legitimize the tort’s
existence by other means, for example by reference to a pressing need
brought about by a gap in the legal protection of privacy. Related to this,
the initial impetus to recognize an action may be of little significance if
courts, in practice, find valid, well-considered reasons for its adoption.
2. The spread and limits of the false light tort
False light quickly found relatively widespread acceptance following the
publication of Prosser’s article and the tort’s subsequent inclusion in the
Restatement in 1967.109 However, the spread of the tort has to be viewed
in the context of the increasing restrictions being placed on defamation
actions in this period.
In 1964, the US Supreme Court’s decision in Sullivan constitutionalized
the law of libel,110 placing stringent restrictions on the ability of public
official plaintiffs to recover.111 In such cases, “actual malice,” that is proof
of either knowledge of the falsehood or reckless disregard in relation to it,
was required. This requirement was in subsequent decisions then extended
to defamation suits involving plaintiffs who were public figures.112 For a
short time, the “actual malice” requirement was extended even further to
apply in all matters of “public interest” before “[t]he law then retreated
to a dichotomy between defamation on matters of public concern in
which the plaintiff is a public official or public figure, and defamation on

106. Ibid at 790.
107. Ibid at 787.
108. For Zimmerman, supra note 42 at 382, Prosser’s “efforts at creative taxonomy…in a real sense
‘invented’ the false light tort by singling out previously unacknowledged features common to most of
the nonadvertising [sic] appropriation cases.”
109. James B Lake, “Restraining False Light: Constitutional and Common Law Limits on a
Troublesome Tort” (2009) 61:3 Fed Comm LJ 625 at 637.
110. Sullivan, supra note 99.
111. Smolla, supra note 100.
112. Curtis Publishing Co v Butts, 388 US 130 (1967); Associated Press v Walker, 389 US 889
(1967).

Illuminating False Light: Assessing the Case for the
False Light Tort in Canada

619

matters of public concern in which the plaintiff is a private figure.”113 For
plaintiffs falling into the latter category, the required level of fault must be
at least negligence but varies depending on the state in which the action
was initiated.114 The decision in Gertz in 1974 also limited the recovery
of presumed or punitive damages to claims that had satisfied the “actual
malice” fault requirement.115 On top of these restrictions, the Supreme
Court established a further line of constitutional limitations impeding the
ability of plaintiffs to recover.116
The cumulative impact of these changes was to significantly narrow
the opportunities for plaintiffs seeking damages for defamation. False
light was therefore often used as an alternative or supplementary means of
legal redress for plaintiffs suffering reputational damage from defamatory
expression.117 Nonetheless, the limits of the tort were quickly established
through two important decisions by the US Supreme Court.
In Time, Inc v Hill,118 the Supreme Court considered an action for
invasion of privacy based on New York’s privacy statute. The reliance
on the statute meant that the action was technically for commercial
appropriation.119 Nonetheless, the facts of the case were a close fit for a
false light action as at the root of the action was a claim based on a nondefamatory falsehood. In September 1952, the Hill family had been held
hostage for nineteen hours by three convicts on the run.120 The story later
inspired a novel loosely based on the events in which the hostage-takers
behave menacingly and at times violently toward their hostages, contrary
to their actual behaviour.121 The novel was itself turned into a Broadway
play the following year, and Life magazine published a photo essay on

113. Smolla, supra note 100.
114. Gertz, supra note 76 at 345-346.
115. Ibid at 349.
116. Amongst other factors, actual malice must be demonstrated with “convincing clarity” while
appellate courts have been entitled to engage in “independent review” in relation to First Amendment
cases. There has been increased use of summary review limiting severely the number of libel cases
which go to a jury and the characterization of plaintiffs as public officials and public figures has been
very liberally applied. See David A Anderson, “Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?” (1991) 140:2 U Pa L
Rev 487 at 494-501.
117. See Section V, below.
118. 385 US 374 (1967) [Time].
119. Zimmerman, supra note 42 at 384.
120. Alex Alben, “Privacy and the Press—An Examination of how the Supreme Court Confused
Press Freedom and False Light Privacy in Critical Cases” (2017) 28 Stan L & Pol’y Rev 13 at 3.
121. According to the Hills, the hostage-takers behaved civilly throughout, and the detention
ended without further incident when the convicts left the home, although two of the hostage-takers
subsequently were killed in the police’s attempt to apprehend them. See Don R Pember & Dwight L
Teeter, Jr., “Privacy and the Press Since Time, Inc. v. Hill” (1974) 50:1 Wash L Rev 57 at 63.
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it.122 Unlike the novel and the play,123 Life’s article named the family as
the subject, falsely attributed the more sensationalist elements of the novel
and play to the Hills’ actual experience, and printed photographs of the
actors recreating scenes from the play at the Hills’ former home.
Mr. Hill had originally won damages of $30,000, but the Supreme
Court found narrowly in favour of Time, Inc, remanding the case for a
new trial. The majority of the Court held that the constitutional protections
for speech and press meant that false reports were protected from liability
unless the plaintiff could prove either that the defendant knew the report
was false or was reckless in his or her disregard of the truth.124 Although
the Supreme Court judgment never mentioned “false light” and instead
referred to the “doctrine of fictionalization,”125 the Time decision made
clear that the constitutional protections established against defamation
actions in Sullivan were applicable in privacy actions.126
The only other time the US Supreme Court has considered false light
was in Cantrell v Forest City Publishing Co in 1974.127 The action was
brought by Mrs. Cantrell and her children following two stories about her
in a Cleveland newspaper. Mrs. Cantrell’s husband had been among the
forty-four victims killed when a bridge collapsed.128 After publishing a
first story on the consequences of the tragedy on the Cantrell family, the
journalist returned to the family for a follow-up without the knowledge
or consent of Mrs. Cantrell.129 The second article implied that the widow
had been present during the interview and portrayed the family as living in
poverty within a “dirty and dilapidated” home.130 The Cantrells had won at
trial although their claim for punitive damages was rejected by the district
judge on the basis that there had been no evidence of the common law
standard of malice.131 The verdict was overturned by US Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit, which appeared to have considered that the required
standard of fault from Time (ie knowledge of falsity or recklessness in
disregard for the truth) had not been met and that there was no evidence
of knowledge on the part of the defendant.132 When the Supreme Court
122. Ibid.
123. Bryan R Lasswell, “In Defense of False Light: Why False Light Must Remain a Viable Cause of
Action” (1993) 34:1 S Tex L Rev 149 at 155-156.
124. Time, supra note 118 at 387-388.
125. Ibid at 385, n 9.
126. McKenna, supra note 41 at 132.
127. 419 US 245 (1974) [Cantrell].
128. Zimmerman, supra note 42 at 388.
129. Lasswell, supra note 123 at 156.
130. Cantrell, supra note 127 at 248.
131. Ibid at 251-252.
132. Ibid.
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considered the appeal, it found that the district judge’s instructions to the
jury adequately communicated that knowledge or recklessness on the part
of the defendant was necessary for a verdict for the plaintiff.133 In addition,
the majority held that there was ample evidence at trial to suggest the
journalist knew of the falsehoods contained within the publication and
that the defendant was liable as his employer.134 The Court, however, was
unwilling to comment on whether a lower standard of fault would be
constitutional.
Together, the decisions in Time and Cantrell appeared to have
simultaneously confirmed the valid existence of the false light tort and
established some limitations on it. For Zimmerman, however, the Supreme
Court had given the false light action “a generous reception.”135 The tort
indeed appeared to have been readily accommodated across different
jurisdictions in the US. Reported false light actions began to multiply with
Kelso recording in 1992 that there had been over 350 cases at the state
level and more than 250 federal cases since Prosser’s article in 1960.136
In a number of states (New York, Virginia, Wisconsin, Nebraska, Rhode
Island), privacy statutes occupied the field and prevented the recognition
of additional privacy torts,137 but where this was not the case, the false
light tort appeared to gain general recognition. Whether this was due to
courts recognizing a compelling case for the tort or due instead to Prosser’s
unique position of influence to mould American tort law according to his
design is a moot point.138 As critics of the action have shown, in many
US jurisdictions, courts simply grounded the existence of the tort in its
inclusion in the Restatement without extensive analysis of its advantages
and disadvantages.139 Moreover, it was apparent that false light’s rise was
133. Ibid at 252.
134. Ibid at 253-254.
135. Zimmerman, supra note 42 at 392. Zimmerman is critical of the Supreme Court’s judgment for
not subjecting the false light action to a more extensive and rigorous examination of the state’s interest
in limiting free speech (ibid at 385).
136. Kelso, supra note 43 at 783.
137. Privacy actions in New York have to be based on Section 51 of the NY Civil Rights Law. See
Howell v New York Post Co, Inc, 612 NE (2d) 699 at 703 (NY Ap Ct 1993). Similarly, Virginian
courts have rejected the availability of remedy for invasion of privacy outside the available statutory
protection in the state: see WJLA-TV v Levin, 564 SE (2d) 383 at 395, n 5 (Va Sup Ct 2002). For
Wisconsin, see Zinda v Louisiana Pacific Corp, 440 NW 2d 548 at 555 (Wis Sup Ct 1989). The
privacy statutes of Nebraska (Nebraska Revised Statute § 20-204 (1979)) and Rhode Island (Rhode
Island General Laws § 9-1-28.1(a)(4) (2009)) explicitly recognize false light as a cause of action.
138. Neil M Richards and Daniel J Solove point out that Prosser’s position as “a well-regarded torts
scholar…[,] the leading treatise writer and casebook author…[and] chief reporter for the Second
Restatement of Torts” allowed unique influence over subsequent privacy jurisprudence” (“Prosser’s
Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy” (2010) Cal L Rev 1887 at 1890).
139. See Harvey L Zuckman, “Invasion of Privacy—Some Communicative Torts Whose Time Has
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also connected to the broader context of changes in American defamation
law.
3. Turning off the false light? The growing backlash against a
“nebulous”140 tort
David A Elder claimed that by 1991 “[t]he great majority of jurisdictions
have found no difficulty with the false light tort under state law.”141
However, resistance to the tort had already been evident for some time.
Legal scholars increasingly called for a reformulation or abolition of the
tort while there were also indications of judicial reconsideration of the
tort’s value.
In addition to scrutiny of the origins of false light, criticisms from legal
scholars have focused on a number of problems: the indistinct interests
protected by the tort,142 the overlap with other forms of action and the
associated argument that false light has been used to evade defamation’s
procedural restrictions,143 the chilling effect it has on free speech,144 the
vagueness of the highly offensive standard,145 and even the difficulty in
distinguishing between truth and falsehoods.146 Later sections of this
paper will explore further the first three of these critiques, but for now, it is
sufficient to note that the academic re-assessment of the tort found an echo
in some state courts.
In 1984, the Supreme Court of North Carolina rejected the false light
tort on both practical and constitutional grounds.147 In Renwick, a college
dean previously involved in student admissions of African-American
students sued for false light and libel following the publication of an
article which, he alleged, attributed false statements to him, depicting him
as “an extremist, a liar and…irresponsible in his position.”148 The Court,
however, refused to recognize the false light tort due to its overlap with
defamation and its negative impact on constitutionally protected free
speech. Moreover, the Court speculatively asserted that the problems of a

Gone” (1990) 47:1 Wash & Lee L Rev 253 at 255; Kelso, supra note 43 at 825.
140. Prosser, supra note 16 at 398.
141. Elder, supra note 70 at 264.
142. McKenna, supra note 41 at 116-119; Zimmerman, supra note 42 at 371, 432.
143. McKenna, supra note 41 at 130; Zimmerman, supra note 42 at 394; Kelso, supra note 43 at 846;
Zuckman, supra note 139 at 258.
144. Zimmerman, supra note 42 at 435; Zuckman, supra note 139 at 257.
145. Zimmerman, supra note 42 at 374, 434.
146. Ibid at 406.
147. Renwick v News and Observer Publishing Co, 312 SE (2d) 405 at 412 (NC Sup Ct 1984)
[Renwick].
148. Ibid at 409.
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prying, intrusive media identified by Warren and Brandeis were in the past
due to higher standards of journalistic training.149
The Renwick judgment seemed to inspire courts elsewhere to look
more critically at the false light tort. Some courts, like the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts in Elm Medical Laboratory, Inc v RKO General,
Inc, swiftly dispensed with implausible claims without definitively ruling
out recognition in due course.150 Of more significance, however, were the
decisions of the Supreme Courts of Texas and Minnesota in Cain v Hearst151
and Wal-Mart152 respectively. Each court weighed the advantages and
disadvantages of false light and rejected its adoption within their respective
states. In both cases, the majority agreed with the Renwick judgment
that the action largely duplicated existing torts, notably defamation, and
infringed on constitutionally protected free speech.153 Duplication and free
speech concerns were woven together to provide a catch-all justification
for rejection of the tort. If false light failed to add any additional protection,
then there was little reason for its existence. If, however, false light did add
significantly to the protection against publicized falsehoods afforded to
individuals, then it constituted an unacceptable threat to free speech.154
The backlash against false light in the courts has not, however,
been ineluctable. Since the turn of the century, the Supreme Courts of
Colorado155 and Florida156 have rejected the tort, but false light has also
been expressly approved by courts in Tennessee,157 Ohio,158 Missouri,159
and Nevada.160 Where earlier adoption of the tort by state courts was often
accomplished by rote reference to the Restatement, it is notable that the last
four decisions engaged with the issues raised by other courts and academic
commentary and have still found sufficient grounds to adopt the action.
Nonetheless, the history of the tort in the US highlights its mixed judicial
reception and its problematic relationship to the specific development of
American defamation law. To assess the case for the tort’s importation into
Canada, the following sections address the three most potent criticisms
149. Ibid at 413.
150. In the words of Justice Nolan, “[t]his court has not recognized that tort and does not choose to do
so now.” See 532 NE (2d) 675 at 681 (1989).
151. 878 SW 2d 577 (Tex Sup Ct 1994) [Cain].
152. Wal-Mart, supra note 40.
153. Ibid at 235-236; Cain, supra note 151 at 580-583.
154. Cain, supra note 151 at 583.
155. Bueno, supra note 20.
156. Rapp, supra note 20.
157. West, supra note 20 at 645-646.
158. Welling v Weinfeld, 866 NE (2d) 1051 at 1057 (Ohio Sup Ct 2007) [Welling].
159. Meyerkord v Zipatoni Co, 276 SW (3d) 319 at 324 (Mo App ED 2008) [Meyerkord].
160. Franchise Tax Bd. of California v Hyatt, 335 P (3d) 125 at 141 (Nev Sup Ct 2014) [Franchise].
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of the tort: the uncertain interests protected by the tort, its independent
viability as a cause of action, and its relationship to freedom of speech.
IV. False light as privacy tort? The interests protected
Part of the confusion surrounding false light lies in Prosser’s problematic
original formulation, which identified the interest protected as being
“clearly that of reputation, with the same overtones of mental distress as
in defamation.”161 Prosser also suggested it often operated as a functional
equivalent to defamation “affording a needed remedy in a good many
instances not covered by the other tort”162 and contemplated the prospect
of false light “swallowing up and engulfing the whole law of public
defamation.”163 From the outset, then, the tort’s independence was in
question due to the failure to locate its purpose in protecting a distinct
privacy interest.164 According to Nathan E Ray, the Supreme Court’s
analysis in Time reinforced the conflation of false light and defamation.165
The Court grafted the constitutional restrictions for defamation onto false
light without exploring whether the same interest was protected by both
actions. Prosser’s focus on reputation has provided ammunition for critics
who contend that false light is unnecessary due to its considerable overlap
with defamation. Moreover, the identification of reputation as the key
interest protected has led some to question whether the tort is properly
grouped with the other privacy actions.166
US courts have been divided, sometimes internally, about whether
false light protects reputation or the right to be let alone. The majority
judgments in Renwick167 and in Cain168 did not explicitly state that the
interest protected by false light was reputation, but the action’s overlap
with defamation was a dominant theme of both decisions. By contrast,
the dissents in both cases characterized the interest protected as a privacy
interest.169 Disagreement on this point has continued to characterize
161. Prosser, supra note 16 at 400. It is a curious feature of Prosser’s conceptualization of the four
privacy torts that he only identifies one, intrusion upon seclusion, with the protection of mental
tranquility. Arguably, this interest inheres in all four actions and provides a clear rationale for grouping
them together.
162. Ibid at 401.
163. Ibid.
164. See Suzanne Reynolds Greenwood, “Privacy: The Search for a Standard” (1975) 11:4 Wake
Forest L Rev 659 at 668-670 for a similar critique.
165. Nathan E Ray, “Let There Be False Light: Resisting the Growing Trend Against an Important
Tort” (2000) 84:3 Minn L Rev 713 at 727.
166. Ellen Alderman & Caroline Kennedy, The Right to Privacy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995)
at 156, 195.
167. Renwick, supra note 147.
168. Cain, supra note 151.
169. Renwick, supra note 147 at 415; Cain, supra note 151 at 586.
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the subsequent case law. Courts in Tennessee,170 Ohio,171 Missouri,172
Nevada,173 and Hawai’i174 have all recognized that false light safeguards
a privacy interest whereas courts in Colorado175 and Florida176 have found
that such judgments depend on “parsing a too subtle distinction between
an individual’s personal sensibilities and his or her reputation in the
community.”177
Aside from its perceived proximity to defamation, Bruce A McKenna
suggests a further, more philosophical, reason to doubt false light’s status
as a privacy action. He argues that by its very nature a false statement
about an individual cannot be something he or she wanted to keep private:
[T]he person referred to in the statement cannot intend to keep private a
matter which, in her own mind, does not exist. If the statement is false,
then the person about whom it is made would have no reason to be aware
of its subject matter. It must be questioned, therefore, how that individual
can desire to keep the subject matter of the publication a private matter.178

In a similar vein, Jonathan Schonsheck argues that false light is a sui generis
tort, rather than a privacy one, as it does not necessarily involve an invasion
of privacy and is more damaging to the victim’s “social persona.”179 For
Schonsheck, attempts to find logical similarity between false light and the
three other privacy torts become “contorted, strained, even paradoxical.”180
These arguments are not especially convincing. An individual may desire
to keep their private affairs hidden from public view: any publicity given
to these affairs, even if false, is still an affront to the individual’s dignity.
In addition, the person affected by a false representation of their private
affairs may think it necessary to correct the public record, thus requiring
him or her to make an unwanted public statement. In this way, it could
be argued that the individual’s interest in privacy has been compromised
twice.

170. West, supra note 20 at 645-646.
171. Welling, supra note 158 at 1057.
172. Meyerkord, supra note 159 at 324.
173. Franchise, supra note 160 at 141.
174. Chung v McCabe Hamilton & Renny Co, Ltd, 128 P (3d) 833 at 848 (Hawai‘i Sup Ct 2006).
175. Bueno, supra note 20 at 902.
176. Rapp, supra note 20 at 1109.
177. Bueno, supra note 20 at 902.
178. McKenna, supra note 41 at 126.
179. “The Unrelenting Darkness of False Light: A Sui Generis Tort” in Ann E Cudd & Mark C
Navin, eds, Core Concepts and Contemporary Issues in Privacy, AMINTAPHIL: The Philosophical
Foundations of Law and Justice, vol 8 (Cham: Springer, 2018) at 97.
180. Ibid at 103.
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Rather than define false light by its protection of reputation, it seems
more appropriate to ground false light in the protection it accords individual
privacy.181 While defamation concerns an objective, external reputational
interest, “[i]n privacy cases the interest affected is the subjective one of
injury to [the] inner person.”182 How this is more precisely delineated,
however, has been the subject of considerable academic contention. Ken
Gormley suggests four definitional clusters emerging from the literature:
(1) privacy as “an expression of one’s personality or personhood, focussing
upon the right of the individual to define his or her essence as a human
being”; (2) privacy as an issue of autonomy, “the moral freedom of the
individual to engage in his or her own thoughts, actions and decisions”;
(3) privacy as the control of information about oneself; and (4) “mix and
match” definitions that conceptualize privacy as in terms of multiple key
elements.183 Gormley’s catholic approach, finding value in each of these
competing definitions, is adopted here as it provides a broad analytical
framework capturing the key conceptual dimensions of privacy.184
The four definitional clusters outlined by Gormley suggest a clear
basis for justifying the false light action by its protection of privacy
interests. While the third approach—the right to determine whether, how
much, when and with whom personal information is shared with others—
is most obviously engaged by false light claims, the first two definitions
also have some relevance. An individual’s right to express their personality
is arguably infringed by widely disseminated falsehoods. The disjuncture
between their self-expression and others’ characterization of them
will likely diminish their reputation externally, but the publicly known
falsehoods may also cause an internal injury if it limits or distorts their
capacity for self-expression. The right to autonomy is also circumscribed
by publicized false claims as it constrains the freedom to think, act and
make decisions: the subject of a publicized falsity is forced into a decision
about whether and how to respond.185
Determining the interest protected by false light as the right to privacy
provides the tort with a stronger foundation. Not only does this help dispel
concerns that the action overlaps too extensively with defamation, it also
provides a stronger justification for recovery in non-defamatory false

181. Lasswell, supra note 123 at 170; McKenna, supra note 41 at 127.
182. Thomas I Emerson, “The Right of Privacy and Freedom of the Press” (1979) 14:2 Harv CR-CLL
Rev 329 at 333.
183. Ken Gormley, “One Hundred Years of Privacy” [1992] Wis L Rev 1335 at 1337-1338.
184. Ibid at 1339.
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light cases based on incorrect laudatory statements about a plaintiff.186 If
false light protects reputation, then recovery for reputational damage in
such cases could only be rationalized when the falseness of the laudatory
statement was already known. Where the falsity of the representation of the
plaintiff was not widely known, then it is impossible to claim reputational
damage. Obviously, the false light claim would itself expose incorrect
positive statements about the plaintiff, but basing a claim for reputational
damage on the damage incurred by the claim being made hardly seems
like sound logic. A more coherent approach recognizes that the injuries
sustained are first and foremost internal, as violations of privacy rights.
V. False light as a viable independent cause of action?
According to its critics, a major problem with the false light tort is that it
adds little to existing common law remedies. Its superfluous nature, it is
alleged, can be seen in the significant amount of overlap with other causes
of action, evident in the fact that false light rarely stands as an independent
cause of action and that recovery for false light alone is even rarer. This
section examines these arguments and, by outlining contrasting categories
of false light cases, highlights the differences between a broad conception
of false light, featuring significant intersection with other tort actions,
and a narrower conception emphasizing false light’s discrete nature. The
latter, it will be argued, is most suitable if the tort were to be imported into
Canada.
Section II highlighted that false light shares important elements and
defences with defamation while the interests protected by the tort have
sometimes been identified as reputational as shown in section III. Given
this fundamental similarity, it is not surprising that in practice false light
and defamation actions have often been combined where allowed.187
Such overlap can be criticized for judicial inefficiency, but perhaps more
problematic is the use of false light, a tort “relatively unencumbered by
common law restrictions,”188 to circumvent the strict limitations placed
on defamation actions. Where a defamation action is barred by the statute
of limitations, false light may provide an alternative means of relief.189
186. See West, supra note 20 at 646.
187. Courts have often adopted a critical attitude towards plaintiffs’ attempts to initiate defamation
and false light claims together. For instance, in California, the plaintiff, if initiating actions for both
defamation and false light, must include a claim for a non-defamatory statement; if it does not, the
false light claim is subsumed into the defamation action. See Dworkin v Hustler Magazine Inc, 867 F
(2d) 1188 at 1193 (9th Cir 1989).
188. Zimmerman, supra note 42 at 394; See also Lake, supra note 109 at 638.
189. For instance, the Court in Rinsley v Brandt, 446 F Supp 850 at 858 (D Kan 1977) rejected
adopting the one year limit on defamation actions due to the separate nature of the false light tort.
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Defamation defences have also not always been consistently applied
to false light actions by courts.190 For some authors, this is particularly
concerning given the potential chilling effect of any action imposing
liability for expression.191 Both Elder and Wade make the case that the use
of false light to evade the stringent restrictions on defamation is a positive
feature of the tort,192 but proponents of this view are in the minority and
their opinion is not shared by most courts.193
Kelso’s exhaustive review of false light case law since Prosser’s
article (ie 1960–1992) indicates that the category of false light claims
where defamation was also pleaded is the single largest class of false light
cases.194 The relatively small subset of such cases in which the plaintiff
was awarded damages or where an appellate court allowed the case to
advance to trial do not prove false light’s independent existence as “the
false light claim in each case added absolutely nothing to the plaintiff’s
recovery.”195 False light was also judged to not augment plaintiffs’ claims
when paired with appropriation and/or intentional infliction of emotional
distress.196 The final stage of Kelso’s study examines cases in which
a false light claim standing alone was the basis for recovery or for the
trial proceeding. Cases within this very small subset of false light claims
are more accurately characterized, according to Kelso, as defamation or
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims or a combination of
both. Kelso’s study, therefore, raises strong doubts about the independent
viability and value of false light.
An alternative way to explore this issue is to look at different attempts
to group together false light claims. Based on a thorough examination of
existing US case law, Elder identifies nine types of false light actions.
False light claims have been made based on publicity containing alleged
falsehoods which:
1. implicitly or explicitly portray the plaintiff as implicated in,
suspected of, and/or linked to criminal conduct197;

190. Lake, supra note 109 at 626.
191. See Section V, below.
192. Elder, supra note at 70 at 263; John W Wade, “Defamation and the Right of Privacy” (1962) 15:4
Vand L Rev 1093 at 1120-1122.
193. For instance, most courts have imposed the defamation limitations period on false light claims.
See Kelso, supra note 43 at 858.
194. Ibid at 835.
195. Ibid at 838-839.
196. Ibid at 851, 855.
197. Elder, supra note 70 at 285.
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2. portray the plaintiff as taking part in sexually promiscuous
conduct or conduct otherwise perceived as immoral198;
3. include a picture of, or story about, the plaintiff in a
pornographic or other scurrilous publication199;
4. impute or imply behaviour which, though “unethical,
dishonest, disreputable or exceptionally unseemly,” falls short
of criminal 200;
5. create a negative impression about the plaintiff with respect to
his or her profession, office or business201;
6. inaccurately represent the plaintiff’s financial condition,
regardless of whether the plaintiff was a business-person or
merchant202;
7. depict the plaintiff, who has been the victim of a crime or
is in some other way worthy of sympathy, as pathetic or
ridiculous203;
8. misuse the plaintiff’s name in a non-commercial context,
imputing to him or her false beliefs, legal or political affiliation
or involvement, or status as a litigant, critic or candidate204; or
9. use the plaintiff’s name or picture in some form of advertising
for the defendant’s business or product.205
These nine illustrative categories covering the “spectrum of exposures of
the public self”206 give a strong indication of both the breadth of previous
false light claims and the substantial overlap with other tort actions. Many
of these categories (for instance, 1, 2, 4 and 5) could potentially give rise to
a defamation action in addition to, or in place of, a false light claim, while
the final two types of action seem closer to the appropriation privacy tort.
In addition, a plaintiff in one of these nine scenarios may also be able to
make a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress depending on
the gravity of the distress suffered, the defendant’s behaviour amounting
to “extreme and outrageous conduct,”207 and the jurisdiction.
In contrast to Elder’s categorization, Schwartz’s classification is not so
much an attempt to gather previous false light claims into coherent groups
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Ibid at 286.
Ibid at 287.
Ibid at 291.
Ibid at 292.
Ibid at 293.
Ibid at 294.
Ibid at 295.
Ibid at 296.
Tom Gerety, “Redefining Privacy” (1977) 12:2 Harv CR-CLL Rev 233 at 256.
Restatement, supra note 9 at § 46.
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as to locate the discrete essence of false light. He argues that false light
should be limited to publicizing non-disparaging falsehoods about the
plaintiff208 and suggests four non-exhaustive categories in which false light
properly applies: (1) where the defendant publicizes false non-defamatory
claims about the plaintiff’s private life209; (2) where the defendant makes
false claims about the “deeply personal thoughts or emotions of the
plaintiff”210; (3) where the defendant depicts the plaintiff as “severely
victimized by a variety of circumstances”211; and (4) where the defendant
makes false laudatory claims about the plaintiff.212 Both the Cantrell and
Time decisions fall within the third category and Cantrell can also be
situated in the second group. A case such as Eastwood v Superior Court,213
in which Clint Eastwood sued for false light based on publicized false
accounts of his romantic entanglements, provides an example of the first.
As the alleged relationship depicted did not involve infidelity by either
party, it would be difficult to establish reputational damage, but clearly
there is an invasion of privacy. An example of the final category would be
an unauthorized biography that makes false laudatory claims of its subject
such as in Spahn v Julian Messner, Inc.214
Canadian courts considering adopting the false light tort would face
the choice between the broad version of the tort with hazy definitional
boundaries and substantial overlap with other claims and a minimal version
that provides a cause of action for scenarios not covered by defamation.
As a novel cause of action, it is easier to justify the latter. To adopt the
Restatement’s definition of false light would mean accepting a more
vaguely defined tort characterized by considerable overlap with existing
causes of action. A clear risk entailed in this option would be duplication
resulting in judicial inefficiency. The evidence from Kelso’s study
indicates that the vast bulk of false light actions, at least until 1992, could
have been framed as another cause of action. A narrower false light tort
avoids this replication while still providing recovery for situations where
the publicity given to a non-disparaging falsehood constitutes a significant
invasion of the plaintiff’s privacy. Undoubtedly, a major reason for the
proliferation of false light claims in the US context has been the tightening
of defamation rules.215 As defamation remains a viable option for plaintiffs
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Schwartz, supra note 15 at 892.
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in Canada, there is less functional need to provide an alternative method of
legal recourse. For these reasons, then, a narrow version of the false light
tort is preferable.
It remains to be seen, however, whether this narrow version of false
light services an actual need in society and whether the privacy interests
violated are sufficiently serious to warrant extension of the common
law. The narrow definition of false light grounded in the right to privacy
suggested here helps minimize the overlap with other causes of action and
as such, establishes a stronger claim for its distinctiveness. What it does
not establish is that the privacy interests involved are suitably widespread
to warrant legal recognition. The limited evidence of distinct false light
cases identified in Kelso’s study does not substantiate a need for this novel
cause of action. Furthermore, the nature of the privacy interest infringed
may itself not be worthy of protection. A recurrent concern even mentioned
by Prosser is that the tort may encourage the initiation of trivial claims.216
The “highly offensive to a reasonable person” standard may help to limit
frivolous claims succeeding, but if applied strictly would work to shrink
further the number of viable false light actions.
VI. False light and free speech: A chilling effect?
This section assesses the extent to which false light potentially impinges
on free speech through an exploration of the contrasting approaches to free
speech in the American and Canadian contexts and the specific mechanism
by which false light could have a chilling effect. Although the adoption
of false light in Canada would probably not give rise to the same level of
concern, the chilling argument cannot be entirely disregarded, particularly
for media organizations.
As shown earlier, changes in American defamation law in the 1960s
and 1970s significantly restricted the ability of plaintiffs to recover. Despite
this, David A Anderson argues that the “remnants of American libel law”
still have a chilling effect due to the interaction of a constitutionally
permissive regime encouraging publishers to libel, the small but extant
possibility of a large jury award incentivising plaintiffs, and costly and
protracted litigation.217 However, from a comparative perspective, US
legal protection of free speech is extremely strong.218 At least some of
the free speech anxiety expressed in academic and judicial commentary
about false light seems attributable to this very particular framework. For
instance, Zimmerman’s contention that false light has “a severe chilling
216. Prosser, supra note 16 at 401.
217. Anderson, supra note 116 at 487, 550.
218. See eg Grant v Torstar Corp, 2009 SCC 61 at para 85 [Grant].
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effect on the communication of accurate information”219 is perhaps only
comprehensible in the US context.
The purported chilling effect of false light would likely be less of a
concern if the tort was imported into Canadian jurisdictions. A repeated
theme of Canadian jurisprudence has been that individual rights are not
absolute and this is equally true of freedom of speech.220 Freedom of
expression is protected in Canada by section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms, but this right is qualified by section 1 of the
Charter, which allows that Charter rights can be subject to “reasonable
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society.”221 While the Charter does not apply directly to the
common law when the dispute is between two non-governmental actors,222
the Supreme Court of Canada has made clear that the common law has to be
interpreted in a manner consistent with Charter principles.223 Accordingly,
in recent years the common law of defamation has been modified to allow
greater protection for freedom of expression on public interest issues.
The Supreme Court, in Grant, recognized a new defence of “responsible
communication on matters of public interest” in defamation actions224
while in WIC Radio Ltd v Simpson, the Court expanded the availability
of the fair comment defence by clarifying that the defence was to be
assessed according to an objective standard, that is whether on the proven
facts anyone could honestly have expressed the defamatory comment.225
However, despite the expanded defences available to defendants, the law
of defamation is still much more plaintiff-friendly in Canada than in the
US.226
The difference between the approaches to free speech in the American
and Canadian contexts can be seen in the contrasting attitudes towards
balancing freedom of expression against other concerns. In the Canadian
context, this is a recurrent feature of Supreme Court of Canada judgments
which have “recognized that the values of individual reputation, emotional
security and privacy protected by civil responsibility for libel should be
219. Zimmerman, supra note 42 at 370.
220. See eg Grant, supra note 218 at para 2.
221. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
222. RWDSU v Dolphin Delivery Ltd, [1986] 2 SCR 573, 33 DLR (4th) 174.
223. Hill v Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 SCR 1130 at para 91, 126 DLR (4th) 129
[Hill].
224. Grant, supra note 218 at para 7.
225. 2008 SCC 40 at paras 49-51 [WIC Radio].
226. Mitchell Drucker, “Canadian v. American Defamation Law: What Can We Learn from
Hyperlinks” (2013) 38 Can-USLJ 141 at 142, 150; Adrienne Stone, “Defamation of Public Figures:
North American Contrasts” (2005) 50:1 NYL Sch L Rev 9.
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given equal weight with the values of democratic self-governance and
truth finding that are protected by freedom of expression.”227 By contrast,
similar balancing exercises undertaken in the past by the US Supreme
Court have been much more controversial for, among other things, not
giving meaningful content to the First Amendment.228

The different approach to free speech issues in the two
countries suggests that, were the false light tort to be adopted in
Canada, anxiety about its chilling effect would likely be less
pronounced. Where such concerns were raised by defendants,
courts could fall back on a balancing exercise weighing the quasiconstitutional privacy interest229 of the plaintiff with the defendant’s
right to free expression. In other words, the tension between the two
rights at stake in a false light case would not in itself be a reason to
reject the tort’s adoption.
The chilling effect argument, though, cannot be rejected
entirely. One objection against false light is that it would encourage
much greater conservatism on the part of media organizations as
from an editorial standpoint, false non-defamatory statements are
difficult to identify.230 News stories that injure the reputation of the
plaintiff can be easily recognized prior to publication and their claims
subjected to close scrutiny. Reporting that presents its subjects in
a neutral or positive manner does not raise such concerns and so
liability for false light claims can be avoided only by “laboriously
checking the accuracy of all statements of fact about individuals
presented by the reporters and researchers.”231 Such a development
would strain the capacity of many media organizations, particularly
at a point when journalism is acknowledged by many to be in
crisis.232 Recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions have pointed
227. Peter A Downard, The Law of Libel in Canada, 4th ed (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2018) at 26-27. For
examples of this, see Hill, supra note 223 at para 107; WIC Radio, supra note 225 at para 2; Grant,
supra note 218 at para 46.
228. Thomas I Emerson, “Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment” (1962) 72:5 Yale LJ
877 at 913-914; Laurent B Frantz, “The First Amendment in the Balance” (1962) 71:8 Yale LJ 1424 at
1443.
229. Lavigne v Canada (Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages), 2002 SCC 53 at paras
24-25 [Lavigne].
230. Zuckman, supra note 139 at 257.
231. Ibid [emphasis in original].
232. Victor Pickard, “Can Government Support the Press? Historicizing and Internationalizing a
Policy Approach to the Journalism Crisis” (2011) 14:2 Communication Rev 73.
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to the fundamental role of freedom of expression233 and the integral
role played by the communications media in Canadian democracy.234
While this freedom must be balanced against the quasi-constitutional
right to privacy recognized in Lavigne,235 the chilling risk posed
by false light may be too great, particularly given the concerns
identified earlier that the specific privacy interest being protected is
neither sufficiently widespread nor serious enough to warrant legal
protection.
Conclusion
The false light tort has not been extinguished in the US despite a growing
movement against it in the 1980s and 1990s. Since the turn of the century,
state courts have continued to adopt the tort and Prosser’s privacy tort
framework remains the primary point of reference for American discussion
of privacy protection under the common law. The decisions in Jones and
Doe signalled a new openness to Prosser’s privacy torts on the part of
Ontario courts with the recognition of false light in Yenovkian a further
step in this direction. However, before other Canadian common law
courts embrace false light, they should consider whether the tort is truly
necessary in the Canadian context. The history and development of the tort
in the US highlight uncertainty over the interests false light protects and
concern about its impact on free speech. The action’s substantial overlap
with defamation is also important: the growth of false light claims is
clearly connected to the specific American context, that is the increasingly
restrictive parameters of defamation law in the US. These criticisms
can be blunted by reframing the tort to protect privacy interests, not
reputation, and by permitting relief only where the publicly communicated
information about the plaintiff is non-defamatory. The regular use of false
light in conjunction with, or in place of, defamation and appropriation
actions can be avoided by establishing a more coherent version of the tort
that provides protection only in scenarios unlikely to be covered by other
causes of action.
Yet, it remains uncertain, even in a world of routine privacy
infringements, whether there is a sufficient need for such an action.
Genuine false light cases are relatively rare, and it is questionable whether
the violation of privacy involved in such fact patterns rises to a level
requiring legal remedy. Furthermore, recognizing potential liability for
233. Grant, supra note 218 at paras 1, 42.
234. Ibid at para 52.
235. Lavigne, supra note 229 at paras 24-25.
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non-defamatory expression, though less likely to cause consternation in
the Canadian context, may still unduly hamper the work of the media.
Together, these factors strongly favour judicial conservatism and courts
facing false light claims should reject. Novel torts should not be recognized
too hastily as “[d]octrinal limbs too swiftly shaped, experience teaches,
may prove unstable.”236
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